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ABStRAct
In spite of many years’ efforts, it is difficult to prove substantial improvements of the work environ-
ment and policymakers are continuously searching for new efficient strategies.  This paper exam-
ines the concept of orchestration of work environment programs, based on an empirical analysis 
of recent Danish policy. Orchestration is a strategy where different stakeholders and activities are 
integrated into a unified program aimed at a specific target group.  The analysis includes three 
policy cases, supplemented with two company case studies.  The research shows a move toward a 
more governance type of regulation, which is not only emerging in network but also includes more 
explicitly orchestrated policy programs.  The stakeholders participate in the network with different 
interests and the orchestration of work environment policies is therefore built on a platform of 
regulation, as it is especially important for employers and unions as key stakeholders in order to 
accept these shared policies.
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1 Introduction
Since regulation of the work environment took off in the late 19
th century, society 
has struggled to find effective policies to secure a healthy and safe work environ-
ment. The main approach has been legislation and enforcement. In the early stage, 
there was an entirely command-control approach; since the 1970s, a more reflexive 
approach has been pursued (Aalders & Wilthagen, 1997). There is a general agreement 
1 You can find this text and its DOI at https://tidsskrift.dk/njwls/index.
2 E-mail: hasle@business.aau.dk.
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that regulation plays a crucial role (Mischke et al., 2013), but governments have also 
been criticized for providing too little regulation and/or too limited resources for the 
sufficient control by the labor inspectors (Walters et al., 2011), from the standpoint that 
more regulation will improve the effect. However, even in the case of strong legislation 
and extensive resources for inspections, which was the case in Denmark from 2005 
to 2012, where practically all companies were visited by inspectors (Jensen & Jensen, 
2004), there are no clear indications that this made a decisive improvement in the work 
environment. 
A number of other stakeholders – including the social partners, professional bodies, 
and research institutions – have subsequently been involved in the efforts to improve the 
ability of companies and organizations to prevent occupational diseases and accidents. 
This included, for example, efforts to develop other policy instruments such as dis-
semination of information, training, advisory services, OHS management systems, and 
economic incentives, in some countries related to insurance systems. Such efforts have a 
strong component of civil society where professional organizations, employer organiza-
tions, unions, insurance companies, and others play an important role, although it seems 
inevitable that the government is providing the legislative framework and economic 
support. 
However, the number of occupational accidents and diseases seem to be rela-
tively constant and policymakers are searching for new strategies which can have a 
stronger impact on the work environment. One of the possibilities which have been 
pursued especially since the Millennium is stronger collaboration and coordination 
between the work environment authorities, the social partners, and the many other 
stakeholders in the field, mixing different policy instruments (Flanagan et al., 2011). 
It is a strategy which has been termed orchestration in Danish work environment 
discussions (Kamp & Koch, 1998; Koch, 2002). It fits well with the Nordic context 
where collaboration and dialogue play an important role both in politics and the 
labor market (Dyreborg, 2011; Hasle & Sørensen, 2013; Rosness & Forseth, 2015), 
and although not focusing on orchestration as a concept, Hale (2015) points out that 
the tradition for tripartite dialogue and collaboration is the main difference to the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition for work environment regulation in UK and USA. It is, how-
ever, a strategy which has not been studied in the work environment research litera-
ture. There is therefore a need to clarify how orchestration can be conceptualized and 
to analyze the mechanisms, which may open possibilities for a stronger impact on the 
work environment. By providing a first contribution to the answers to this question, 
we aim to help policymakers make more efficient and integrated policy mixes and at 
the same time provide direction for further research on how a variety of policy instru-
ments utilized by various actors can be combined or orchestrated in order to improve 
the overall work environment. 
Hence, in this article, we make a theoretical contribution by claiming that the 
potential for orchestration of work environment practice derives from the explicit 
and transparent integration of different policy instruments as well as the activities 
of different actors. And furthermore, that the transformation of such orchestrated 
policy programs into workplace practice can be understood by integrating a tax-
onomy of policy instruments (Vedung, 1998; see also Hasle et al., 2014), institu-
tional isomorphism (see among others DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), and the concept 
of governance (March & Olsen, 1995). We use this theoretical framework for the 
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analysis of three selected Danish cases demonstrating elements of orchestration in 
practice: 
•    The government strategy for the work environment in 2020;
•    The ‘break the trend’ strategy for the construction sector;
•    Prevention packages for small enterprises.
The analysis concludes with a study of two companies that have been exposed to an 
orchestrated program, whereby we illustrate how companies can absorb and transform 
such programs into their workplace practice. We subsequently use the analysis to discuss 
the characteristics of orchestration of a work environment policy and thereby consider 
the possibilities for the orchestration as a strategy to play an important role in strength-
ening the efficiency of work environment policy programs. We contribute specifically 
to the research literature by proposing the first systematic development and definition 
of ‘orchestration’ as a key instrument in the development of work environment policy 
programs.
2 the analytical approach
In order to understand how orchestration can be defined and how it may work, we start 
with a general approach to transformation of policies into workplace practice, building 
on Hasle et al. (2014). They base their theory on Vedung’s (1998) basic taxonomy of 
three policy instruments: regulation, incentives, and information. Vedung argues that 
these three types of instruments comprise all possible instruments. He refers to them 
with the metaphors of sticks, carrots, and sermons. The metaphors illustrate three ways 
to motivate organizations to give priority to state policies –through enforcement (regula-
tion including inspection and prosecution), benefits (incentives), or knowledge (informa-
tion). The three types of instruments represent an asymmetrical relationship between 
the regulator and the recipient of the regulation. The regulating parties have 1) power 
to establish the legal standards, 2) the ability to reallocate resources from the ‘unwor-
thy’ to the ‘worthy’, or 3) knowledge and resources to launch information campaigns, 
which range from those who have knowledge and insight to the beneficiaries who lack 
this knowledge. It follows from this very basic taxonomy that the instruments can be 
designed and combined in many different ways. 
The taxonomy is therefore well in line with the comparative public policy litera-
ture, which points out that single policy measures rarely stand alone and need to be 
integrated with other policy measures (Howlett & Rayner, 2007, 2013). It is especially 
the case when policies are dealing with complex issues or problems such as environ-
mental issues (OECD, 2007), health policies (Sager et al., 2015), or economic poli-
cies. This has been discussed not only as policy mixes in the environmental literature 
(Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999), but also has a longer history in economic policy, where, 
for example, the Nobel prize-winning economist Robert Mundell talked about the ‘per-
fect policy mix’ in the 1960s (Flanagan et al., 2011). Such mixed policies are developed 
over time, with multiple policies in play at the same time and often without much coor-
dination (Howlett & Rayner, 2007, 2013) and their content changes over time through, 
among other factors, policy drift (Hacker et al., 2015). Hence, whereas policy mixes are 
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common in most policy areas including the work environment, orchestration is differ-
ent. The idea of orchestration is that the authorities and other stakeholders actively and 
explicitly develop shared policy programs with converging goals, where they coordinate 
their implementation activities, in order to achieve as strong an impact as possible. It is 
of course not a simple task and we will get back to the constraints in the analysis of the 
empirical cases. 
This simple linear model can be further expanded by adding the governance con-
cept (March & Olsen, 1995; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Government has only a limited 
control of both development and implementation of policy programs, and the scholars 
suggest using the concept of governance, to describe policy as something taking place in 
networks with different stakeholders each with their own interest and capacity. Policy 
programs are therefore to be understood as something not only originating solely from 
governments – although typically dominated by these – but also from the network of 
various stakeholders with interests in the particular policy field. The resulting policies 
are not necessarily developed in an explicit and transparent manner, but are rather the 
result of a historical process where the different stakeholders participate according to 
their interest and capacity. The question is whether and how this network governance 
can be utilized in an explicit manner where the stakeholders develop shared goals and 
each contribute with their capacity to reach the goals. From this point, we can define 
‘orchestration’ as a term for a coordinated policy program that includes several different 
policy instruments and involves different actors in governance network activities. The 
essential program theory of orchestration is that by combining the capacity of different 
stakeholders and reaching a target group with several policy instruments that have been 
adjusted to integrate in time and aim, it is possible to create synergies. Such synergies 
lead to a better overall outcome than would be expected from the individual instruments 
and from a situation in which the individual stakeholders did not try to coordinate 
among themselves. 
A natural question follows – why should the recipient, in this case companies, react 
to these instruments? In the work environment, field inspections are rare and fines low, 
there are few economic incentives and information is scattered (Walters et al., 2011). 
Here, institutional theory can give a useful answer (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). A main driver for organizations is to fulfill the expecta-
tions from society. They need to be legitimate in order to maintain a ‘license to operate’ 
by their many stakeholders. Organizations therefore adopt institutionalized structural 
elements in order to secure their survival (Beck & Walgenbach, 2005). By copying from 
other organizations – in the form of isomorphism – organizations can achieve the nec-
essary legitimacy. There are the three forms of isomorphism: coercive, normative, and 
mimetic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In the case of work environment policy, these 
forms explain an important part of the motivation to act on the work environment in 
companies. In the coercive case, an organization may experience outside pressure as a 
way of forcing implementation of a particular measure; in the normative case, an orga-
nization follow the norms observed among peers and stakeholders; and in the mimetic 
case, the organization does what everybody else seems to be doing, which thereby makes 
the organization legitimate. However, there is no simple interrelation between a mix of 
policy instruments and the isomorphic mechanisms. It depends on the institutionaliza-
tion of the policies (Colyvas & Jonsson, 2011) and the coupling into workplace prac-
tice (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008), which again depends on whether the institutional 
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pressure fits with the internal context and work environment issues of the workplace; 
otherwise, the result may be look-a-like compliance that is actually decoupling (Beck 
& Walgenbach, 2005). This is a situation which is well known in the work environ-
ment field from, for example, Occupational Health and Safety management (Rocha & 
Granerud, 2011) and risk assessment (Walters et al., 2011). 
We have adapted the model suggested by Hasle et al. (2014) to show how an orches-
trated program may work, and we use this model for our analysis of orchestration in 
policy programs in Denmark (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: A model for transformation of policy programs into workplace practice.
We are aware that there are important feedback mechanisms in the model, but in this 
analysis of orchestration in Danish work environment policy, we focus on the program 
theory suggesting direct effects, and we leave the analysis of the role of feedback mecha-
nisms for another study. 
3  the Danish context for orchestration in work  
environment policy programs 
Orchestration has recently gained large interest from authorities and social partners in 
Denmark. The policymakers, authorities, and the social partners highlight orchestration 
as a new strategy for reaching target groups that until now have proven to be very dif-
ficult to motivate to improve the work environment. Examples of such target groups 
include small and medium-sized companies as well as the construction sector. 
Danish work environment legislation is based on tripartism with a considerable 
involvement of employer organizations and unions. Especially within the last decades, 
the Danish Working Environment Authority and the social partners have developed 
a culture of relatively close cooperation (See examples in Hasle & Petersen, 2004; 
Sørensen et al., 2009). Other stakeholders from health care and professional work envi-
ronment organizations are also involved, and a Danish practice has evolved that will 
often combine all three basic policy instruments in programs aimed at the same target 
group, at the same time, and with the same objective. It is from this practice that the idea 
of orchestration has evolved. One early example is the program for reduction of repeti-
tive strain injuries, which included enforcement by the authorities, financial support to 
workplace changes, and extensive information activities. In addition, it also included 
an agreement about reduction of repetitive work between employers and the unions 
(Hasle et al., 2004). 
Such agreements are in line with the general Danish (and Nordic) model of industrial 
relations (Andersen et al., 2014), where the social partners negotiate collective agreements 
on a wide scope of issues. During the last decades, the work environment has increasingly 
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been a topic for such agreements (Hasle & Petersen, 2004; Sørensen et al., 2009). The 
agreements are not dominated by the state, and they have therefore a more symmetrical 
approach to regulation. But they also often reflect some kind of state policy, and agree-
ments are in many cases used to avoid government interference (Hasle et al., 2004; Hasle 
& Petersen, 2004). For the work environment, state regulation is an important part as 
opposed to other issues such as wages that are exclusively handled by the social part-
ners. The Danish work environment regulation has historically been somewhat trapped 
between legislation and government inspections and the voluntary bi-partite industrial 
relations regulation. It has therefore been a challenge to get these systems to work together, 
as argued by Jacobsen (2011). The dependence on a limited cooperation has been criti-
cized for resulting in a stalemate in the development of the work environment (see also 
Busck, 2014). This makes the need for an orchestrated effort even more salient. 
In some cases, the social partners and other nongovernment organizations function in 
close connection or even in symbiosis with the state. For example, this happens in the case 
of bi- and tripartite bodies such as the Danish Work Environment Council and the secto-
rial work environment councils. They are funded by the state and have, on the one hand, a 
relatively strong influence on state policy and thereby application of the three basic policy 
instruments, and on the other hand, they work with interpretation and implementation 
of the determined regulatory state policy, mostly through a broad dissemination of infor-
mation and guidelines. In doing so, information about good practice and warning about 
possible negative consequences of not controlling the risk are the key instruments. The 
information and guidelines from the councils are agreed upon by the social partners and 
thereby also constitute a kind of semi-legal standard, which may receive attention from 
companies, as it expresses a joint opinion from both employers’ associations and unions. 
However, they are also most often a result of defining a common denominator and it is 
not always possible for the social partners to agree on at the best possible solution.
The collaborative strategy has developed considerably since the millennium. The 
government, in collaboration with the Danish Working Environment Authority and the 
Work Environment Council, initiated a planning model starting with a 5-year plan, 
which in 2010 turned into a 10-year strategy, which we analyze more thoroughly in the 
cases analysis. 
4 Methodology
We have, in order to substantiate our theoretical arguments with empirical analysis 
of orchestration, selected four different examples of recent conducted orchestrated 
programs. The case selection reflects a temporal progression in the way programs are 
orchestrated and at the same time the cases span from a general to a specific level as 
the first program partly initiates the next one. These cases are selected because it is pos-
sible to perform a retrospective analysis based upon available data, and we analyze the 
program theory of the cases and relate them to our discussion of orchestration. We have 
not had any influence on the program theory or the performance of the four cases. The 
design of our analysis is a cross-case analysis of multiple cases (Yin, 2014) with the aim 
to understand the underlying program theory, the mix of policy instruments, expected 
mechanisms, and outcome measures in line with the realist evaluation tradition (Pawson, 
2006; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). The results are used to showcase the composition of the 
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orchestration in each case, the reasoning behind them, and to identify possible mecha-
nism related to fact that they are orchestrated by adding together different elements. In 
addition, we analyze the limitations for the application of orchestration as an overall 
work environment policy strategy. 
Our knowledge of the cases is based on published reports, evaluations, and analysis 
of programs that one or several of the authors have been involved in. All data have been 
available for all authors; however, the four cases have each been analyzed by one of the 
authors. The other authors have subsequently reviewed the description, resulting in the 
final case presentation as included in this article. All authors have separately from each 
other analyzed the cases with the aim of identifying mechanisms from the principles of 
realistic evaluation. Below, we describe what kind of material and data we have used 
for each case.
4.1 the Government strategy for a better work environment 2020
The Government strategy is the result of lengthy negotiations between firstly the social 
partners and the authorities and secondly by the Government and political parties in the 
Danish Parliament. These negotiations are often taking place behind closed doors, but 
the resulting strategy as well as midterm reports and background papers are publicly 
available. The final strategy is broadly published in a more popular form, and presented 
through a large number of seminars, conferences, webpages, etc. Papers from the strat-
egy process as well as subsequent publications have been collected for the analysis. Pub-
lications describing earlier attempts to make national programs have also been included. 
The material used in the analysis is listed in the references as it is utilized. 
4.2 the ‘break the trend’ program
The ‘break the trend’ program is an agreement, which accumulates 50 different activi-
ties, covenants, plans, and settlements in the construction sector. We derive our knowl-
edge of this conglomeratic program on a midterm evaluation (since the program is still 
running), which one of the authors has been involved in. This evaluation is carried out 
as a mixed methods design based on realistic evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). It 
encompasses all 50 interventions, but examines especially interventions aimed at the 
four main targets using multiple cases for each target. The evaluation included multiple 
methods with an extensive data material, including chronicle workshops (Ipsen et al., 
2015; Limborg & Hvenegaard, 2011) (n = 6), semi-structured interviews (n = 20), 
questionnaire by computer-assisted telephone interviews (n = 225), and workplace visits 
(n = 30). The evaluation is ongoing, but the preliminary results are published in study by 
Pedersen (2016), which we use in our analysis. 
4.3 the prevention packages
The prevention packages program has been evaluated in a PhD study that two of the 
authors have supervised, and as part of an official evaluations inaugurated by the 
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authorities behind the program (Oxford Research, 2014). The evaluation included in 
the PhD study also built on realistic evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) and studied the 
implementation of prevention package programs in a mixed methods multicase design. 
The cases are small auto-repair shops (n = 6) and small construction companies (n = 6), 
and the data derive from a quantitative questionnaire survey before and after imple-
mentation of the prevention package program in the case companies (n = 294–218), 
qualitative face-to-face individual interviews (n = 32), focus group interviews (n = 20), 
and observations (n = 20). The results of the study have been reported in several articles 
(Hasle et al., 2012; Kvorning et al., 2015, 2016). 
4.4 the company cases
The first company case is a carpentry firm that two of the authors studied as part of 
a project that was conducted for the Danish Construction Association and the labor 
unions in the construction sector in unison. The aim of the project was to assist a selec-
tion (n = 12) of volunteering small construction companies to implement a prevention 
package, while at the same time record and document the kind of assistance they needed. 
Part of the data was subsequently used in an analysis of what mechanisms led the small 
companies to embed the prevention package program in their daily practices and the 
results were reported in an article (Kvorning et al., 2016). The particular companies in 
this case were visited twice; at the first visit, a face-to-face interview was conducted with 
the owner-manager, the safety manager, and the work environment-representative. The 
second visit was used for a recorded focus group interview meeting with the employees. 
In addition, there were five telephone interviews and email correspondences.
The second company case was part of a multiple case research project aimed at 
investigating the potential of a network of small dairy companies to manage their work 
environment challenges in collaboration. Two of the authors conducted the project and 
took part in data collection. The data consist of written minutes and project descrip-
tions, semi-structured interviews (n = 9) of which some were group interviews (n = 4), 
some individual (n = 2), and yet some were telephone interviews (n = 3). In addition, 
three dairies were visited and the observations recorded, as was a series of meetings in 
the network. The methodology and the results are published in studies by Limborg and 
Grøn (2014a) and Limborg and Grøn (2014b).
5 Analysis of orchestrated cases
5.1 the Government strategy for a better work environment 2020
The Government effort to develop more orchestrated policy programs can be traced back 
to the mid-1990s where the Danish Working Environment Authority (WEA) launched 
a plan for what was termed ‘a clean work environment 2005’ (WEA, 1995). The plan 
was made up by seven visions for the work environment on the major risk factors such 
as ‘no fatal accidents 2005’, ‘no hearing losses 2005’, and ‘no musculoskeletal disorders 
2005’. The plan did not include application of any particular policy instruments to reach 
these ambitious goals, and the social partners and other work environment stakeholders 
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were not directly involved. However, an important part of the plan was the initiation 
of a surveillance program where WEA started monitoring the development of the work 
environment (WEA, 2004, 2005).
This plan was followed by a 2010 plan. The social partners became gradually more 
involved especially through The Work Environment Council. One important feature of 
this development was a still stronger consensus about the need to reach the goals and 
to document it, which were changed from the utopian situation of no fatal accidents to 
a reduction of typically 10–20% within the 5-year span. The goals became increasingly 
reflected in the debate about a limited progress in the work environment and the need 
to implement new initiatives. However, the orchestration elements were still rather weak 
and did not involve any coordination or joint programs. 
This situation changed with the 2020 strategy launched in 2011 (WEA, 2010). The 
word ‘plan’ was changed to ‘strategy’ and the same type of goals were included, but now 
with a stronger and clearer priority in the way that only three goals were included:
•    a 25% reduction of serious accidents; 
•    a 20% reduction in psychological overload; 
•    a 20% reduction in overload of musculoskeletal strains. 
The new element in the strategy was the inclusion of 19 activities, which should secure 
the accomplishment of the goals. The most important ones included
•    risk-based inspections;
•    changes in practices regarding the issuing of fines;
•    more dialogue with enterprises;
•    more focus on the psychological work environment;
•    support to small enterprises;
•    reorganization of labels for acceptable work environment;
•    study of companies’ experience with the work environment organization; 
•    new efforts in health promotion;
•    focus on foreign companies;
•    improvement of counseling, guidance, and information about work environment;
•    coordination between different authorities doing inspections;
•    monitoring of the development of the strategic plan.
It is furthermore an integrated part of the strategy to monitor the development of both 
the initiatives and the work environment regarding the three general goals. A midterm 
evaluation was also included. 
The preparation of the strategy was initiated by WEA and the social partners in the 
Work Environment Council were heavily involved in the preparation of the strategic plan, 
which was subsequently approved by the Parliament. The activities focus on Government 
activities implemented by the WEA, with other stakeholders only included to a limited 
extent. The social partners participated in discussions in the preparatory phase through 
the Work Environment Council, and all parties supported the plan. This participation 
implied that the social partners also carried a certain element of coownership of the plan. 
Looking at the applied policy instruments, the individual elements in the plan seem 
relatively weak. The main content of the strategy includes elements of regulation and 
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information but with limited outreach to companies, and it is difficult to envisage that 
the elements should strengthen the isomorphic activities of the companies. For instance, 
the reduction of psychosocial overload, which is a key goal, is expected to be achieved 
through a declaration of how important the psychological work environment is and a 
study of ways to strengthen efforts in this area. But it is also at the same time the most 
extensive example of an orchestrated governmental program launched in Denmark so 
far. The built-in midterm evaluation resulted in a new political agreement about rein-
forcing the strategic plan in 2015, which included 15 new activities – some of them 
with potentially stronger policy instruments and with stronger involvement of the social 
partners (Ministry of Employment, 2015). The most important of these are 
•    strengthening the risk-based inspection through specific initiatives including filling 
gaps in inspection routines;
•    coordination of the activities carried out by WEA and the sector work environment 
councils; 
•    increase in fines issued to companies violating regulation;
•    follow-up on new rules for the organization of collaborative work environment ac-
tivities in companies.
Most of the activities are once more aimed at the practice of the WEA, but the coordina-
tion of the activities between WEA and the sector work environment councils consti-
tute an interesting innovation. The councils are formed by employers’ associations and 
unions; their main task is to develop and disseminate information and guidelines on 
work environment through written material or through the social media. It was the first 
time that WEA committed itself to not only inform but also coordinate their activities 
with the relevant stakeholders. The consequence is that campaigns and focus on particu-
lar risks have to be jointly planned. WEA inspectors carry information material from 
the WEC, the WEC prepare forthcoming material bearing in mind that it can be used 
by inspectors, and social partners inform their members about planned WEA inspection 
activities. It is still a rather new activity that is under development, but it illustrates how 
the overall Danish work environment policy is moving towards a governance model 
with an increasing orchestration as a strategic means to realize the aim of the regulation. 
It is an approach that started by being enforced by the authorities and gradually devel-
oped into a wide scope of the basic policy instruments, although they are still primarily 
based on WEA’s own activities. In the last stage, orchestration has expanded into a more 
binding involvement of the social partners. This development is further elaborated in the 
next case from the construction sector. However, it is difficult to change general trends 
in the labor market and the monitoring of the development in accidents, psychosocial 
overload, and musculoskeletal overload showed in early 2017 a negative development, 
and the minister of employment has therefore announced a revision of the system in 
order to achieve a stronger impact.1
5.2  the ‘break the trend’ plan for the construction sector
A reduction of serious accidents is one of the three priority goals in the strategy for the 
work environment 2020. Construction has always been a sector with one of the highest 
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accident rates. Since the first plan, prepared in 1995, construction has been in focus, 
but few visible results are evident. In order to accomplish the 2020 goals, the social 
partners and other stakeholders in construction prepared a specific plan called ‘break 
the trend’. It is a remarkable plan because all stakeholders in the construction sector 
were involved in both the preparation and the implementation of the plan (BAR-BA, 
2013). They included employers’ associations, unions, construction consultants (engi-
neers and architects), professional building clients, and the WEA as well as others. The 
plan includes 50 activities, some of these were already planned by some of the stake-
holders and others constitute new cross-institutional activities, which were particularly 
developed during the negotiations about the plan. The majority of the activities focus 
on information, and there are only a few examples of other policy instruments. The 
two most important examples are support for vocational training centers in their effort 
to train apprentices in safety and a hotline where construction planners (engineers 
and architects) can get advice on safe construction. WEA is a partner in the plan, but 
the authority was not the driving force as was seen with the overall 2020 plan. Even 
though WEA is a partner, their direct involvement is at a relatively low level, limited to 
participation in a few information activities. For instance, coordination with inspection 
activities, which was included in the revision of the 2020 strategy, was not included in 
the construction sector plan. 
A midterm evaluation of the plan (Pedersen, 2016) concluded that it is an ambi-
tious and orchestrated plan with commitment from the involved stakeholders. How-
ever, digging into the details of some of the major activities, the evaluation reveals 
that the stakeholders, in practice, lack a shared understanding of – or at least assump-
tions of – how the different instruments will be working together, how synergy is 
created, and how the ‘orchestra’ should be conducted in order to reach the audience. 
The stakeholders agree on the immediate activities to undertake and the long-term 
goal of reduction of serious accidents, but they have little idea about what mecha-
nisms may eventually create changes and lead to an achievement of the long term 
goals. In some cases, they also disagreed when questioned about their ideas on that 
point. Even though it is the most extensive orchestrated plan in Denmark, it also 
shows the lack of knowledge about how orchestrated plans can be developed in such 
a way that the possibility of achieving the expected long term outcome is increased. 
At the same time, it shows the limits in orchestration because the plan only includes 
elements that all involved stakeholders can agree upon, and it was one of the main 
reasons for sticking to information as the main policy instrument. It is, for instance, 
mentioned in the introduction to the plan that the unions suggested the introduction 
of a construction identity card in order to secure the identity of all personnel present 
at the workplace, but this proposal was pushed aside by the other stakeholders and 
referred to another forum. 
5.3 the prevention packages
The last example of an orchestrated policy program is ‘the prevention packages’, which 
mainly started as an economic incentive, but was expanded and integrated with both 
regulation and information instruments. The program was launched in 2011 as a part 
of a government effort to reduce exclusion from the labor market due to physical and 
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mental wear and tear (Hasle et al., 2012; Kvorning et al., 2015). The prevention pack-
ages targeted small and medium-sized enterprises in high-risk industries starting with 
construction and car repair followed by a series of packages for other industries. The 
basis for the development of the packages was evidence about successful intervention 
methods. A prevention package consists of a written guide of how the company can 
develop practical prevention interventions in order to reduce musculoskeletal strain, 
accidents, or other work environment problems predominant within the target group 
industries. Small and medium-sized companies could apply for a prevention package 
and were subsequently compensated for the time spent on implementing the package. In 
the construction sector, the companies also received free advice from an external consul-
tant or from a facilitator from WEA. 
The orchestration came about in two ways: integration of inspections and involve-
ment of the social partners (Kvorning et al., 2015). The prevention packages became 
an integrated part of a new inspection strategy aimed at small enterprises in high-risk 
industries. The issues covered by the packages were included in the inspections as well 
as suggestions to apply for a prevention package if the inspector considered it to be 
relevant for the particular small enterprise. The social partners from the specific sectors 
were involved in the preparation of the prevention packages and launched their own 
information activities about the possibility to get economic compensation for efforts to 
improve the work environment. 
Thereby, the prevention packages became an example of orchestration that 
included incentives, regulation, and information. A study of the motivation to apply 
and implement the packages indicated that the ‘stick’ element of regulation could 
push companies to apply for a prevention package even though their motivation to 
improve the work environment was low (Kvorning et al., 2015), whereas information 
through the employers’ association in particular proved to induce a more positive 
motivation. 
5.4 company cases
Most of these programs were developed from the perspective and experience of the 
professional actors. Even though the context of recipients of a policy program is crucial, 
the perception of recipients as well as knowledge and consideration of how different 
recipients will react toward an external effort to improve work environment were rarely 
included in the program theory. Companies or other ‘policy takers’ who are expected 
to be impacted by the program may also react differently to the same program or effort 
(Refslund, 2016). It is therefore obvious that the components of an orchestrated pro-
gram must be experienced as relevant, accessible, and feasible for the recipients in order 
to change their practice if the program is to have any impact. Especially small companies 
need tailoring to the specific context (Hasle & Limborg, 2006; Hasle et al., 2012). Two 
company cases serve to illustrate the recipients’ importance in orchestration of policy 
programs, one from the prevention package and one from a project on the experiences 
of reaching networks of small enterprises (Limborg & Grøn, 2014a; Limborg et al., 
2014). The first example is a small carpentry company that applied for and implemented 
a prevention package (Kvorning et al., 2016). 
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5.4.1 The carpenter
The company is newly founded and expanding. The company’s work environment man-
agement had previously been left to the work environment representative, but as the 
company grew to 12 employees and subcontractors and they received several improve-
ment notices from the labor inspectors, the owner realized that he had to take a more 
proactive approach to work environment management. He decided to take several 
initiatives. One was to apply for the prevention package project, and another was to 
employ a safety coordinator. The owner and the safety coordinator looked into the 
options in the prevention package and chose to implement several of the planning sheets 
from the manual including integration of safety in job task descriptions, in 2-week work 
plans, and in sales quotations. They also addressed their communication procedures and 
involved the employees in the process. The assigned consultant gave feedback to their 
ideas and inspired them with new ideas. The company achieved considerable progress 
in their work environment management, as the owner was eager to learn and capable 
of developing the company. When interviewed, he stated that the main motivator was 
the improvement notices from the labor inspectors. The prevention packages helped 
him to comply with the requirements from the labor inspectors, supporting the relevant 
improvements at the right time and with a content that enabled him to make needed 
changes. It is therefore an example of how regulation was a key initiating policy instru-
ment, but the effect would probably have been limited without the incentive and infor-
mation included in the prevention packages. 
5.4.2 Network of small dairies
Another example is a network of dairies that applied for funding for a prevention 
project from the public funded prevention program that also funded the preven-
tion packages (Limborg & Grøn, 2014b). The dairy industry has a long corporatist 
tradition and has well established corporative structures, high level of unionization, 
and a strong employer organization. The production and market conditions are sta-
ble and formalized, even when resources are limited. In the first decade of the new 
millennium, several small dairies received improvement notices from the WEA due 
to shortcomings concerning poor ergonomics and heavy lifting, which could cause 
musculoskeletal disorders. Many of the small enterprises found it very difficult to 
solve these problems, as no practical technological solutions were available. In the 
wake of the campaign from the WEA, the trade union and a consultant informed the 
group of small dairies about the possibility for public funding of development proj-
ects from the ‘Prevention Fund’, and they supported a process that led to the start of 
a mutual project with the aim to help the involved enterprises improve prevention 
of musculoskeletal disorders. The resulting project included cooperation between the 
enterprises and led to development of different technical equipment for lifting and 
carrying, which were successfully implemented in a number of the enterprises. After 
the development of the new equipment, information was disseminated to all dairies 
in the industry through a series of ‘open house arrangements’ that were well visited 
(Limborg et al., 2014). 
56 Orchestration in Work Environment Policy Programs Peter Hasle et al.
This case shows how the three basic policy instruments interact in an effort that was 
not an orchestrated program planned by the stakeholders, but in practice came to work 
as such. It does so in the way that the improvement notices from inspectors initiated a 
search for possible solutions both by the small dairy enterprises themselves and by other 
stakeholders in the industry. The possibility of receiving economic support provided 
opportunities for the specific project to develop practical solutions and to disseminate 
their efforts to reach out to the whole industry. An interesting element of this case is 
that even if no one deliberately orchestrated the program, it was perceived as integrated 
means by the network and thus was able to create synergy between all elements.
6 Discussion
The analysis of these cases suggests several interesting features of how orchestration 
might function in work environment policies. First, the historical development in Den-
mark shows the move toward governance in networks (Klijn, 2008; March & Olsen, 
1995). This is illustrated by the evolution of government plans and strategies for the 
work environment. The general work environment policy was originally strongly domi-
nated by the government, and it has since then evolved into governance by a network of 
stakeholders with an interest in the work environment. This is beneficial both for form-
ing the policy and for practical implementation. The government still plays a strong role 
by initiating the strategy development and by approving the strategies in parliament, 
but other stakeholders, in particular the social partners, are also highly involved in the 
development of the strategy and specifically in the implementation. 
As the various stakeholders have differing interests, the tendency is to go for the 
lowest common denominator of the network, even though policy programs to a large 
extent are dominated by government. This is particularly reflected in the first govern-
ment plans for the work environment, which were merely broad policy goals that every-
body agreed upon, but did not include any indications of what policy instruments could 
secure the implementation of the goals. The analysis of the three orchestration cases 
suggests that the governance network has developed to a higher level of agreement, not 
only regarding positive goals for the work environment but also regarding application of 
some of the policy instruments. This development is expressed in the close monitoring of 
progress in the 2020 strategy and that the lack of progress in 2015 led to new initiatives 
as well as to rethinking initiatives that proved to have very limited effect. The ‘break the 
trend’ plan is interesting in this context because it was not only based initially on the 
goals of accident reduction in the 2020 strategy but also was almost solely developed by 
the social partners in the Work Environment Council for Construction, which initiated 
the inclusion of the WEA in the strategy. It added to the 2020 strategy a coordination 
of the timeframe, a mutual and more specific target and more focused target groups. 
However, it was still short of a mutual accepted program theory on how the strategy was 
expected to reach the objectives. 
Governance policy development is normally to be understood as emerging based on 
the different stakeholders’ networking activities, but the three cases presented here sug-
gest a move toward what we defined as orchestration. The stakeholders develop shared 
goals in an explicit manner and subsequently establish a program with agreement about 
the policy instruments which the stakeholders expect can achieve these goals. 
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However, the orchestration has its limits. Even though there seems to be a stronger 
element of both shared goals and the use of policy instruments among the stakeholders, 
there will always be differences in interests, which will restrict the level of orchestration. 
The three cases therefore also illustrate that there are limits to the types of policy instru-
ments that can be agreed upon in an orchestrated effort. In an attempt to achieve the 
result, various activities, which are not particularly related to the orchestration or which 
are clearly not sufficient to achieve the goals, are included in the policy program. This 
is also the case when there is a lack of mutual understanding of what mechanisms can 
transform the policy program into workplace practice. Furthermore, it illustrates that 
the stakeholders, even though they acknowledge the importance of orchestration, do not 
yet have a shared and agreed upon understanding of how orchestration works or how 
it can be planned or conducted.
The two company cases demonstrate that government enforcement still is a key ele-
ment in the practical adoption at the workplace level also of the orchestrated programs. 
Inspection and improvement notices played a crucial role for both the individual carpen-
ter company and the dairy sector network. An increased use of orchestration is therefore 
not a substitute for regulation but rather an expansion to a wider and more explicit use 
of various policy instruments, which are still building on a foundation of state regu-
lation. The company cases as well as the prevention packages also illustrate that the 
social acceptance provided by the social partners in terms of accepting the improvement 
notices and supporting the prevention package is important for workplace actions. It is 
therefore particularly important for orchestration strategies that both employers and 
unions participate and express their social approval of the strategy. They thereby con-
stitute an important part of the isomorphism by supporting the norms for an acceptable 
risk level in the companies. The dairy case further shows how the mimetic isomorphism 
can be very important for acceptance of work environment improvement, as companies 
need to be aware that the improvements are working in other similar companies. Both 
cases also show that a synergetic effect of the elements of an orchestrated program is 
not a result of the program itself. It is developed when the target group – in this case 
the carpenter and the diary network – themselves consider the elements integrated by 
enhancing resources to implement improvements or by institutionalization of a mutual 
understanding of a new and improved level of prevention that should be expected by 
themselves and their peers.
The commitment of the nongovernment stakeholders, especially the social partners, 
to an orchestrated policy program should probably also be understood in the context 
of regulation. There need to be a platform where the partners can agree to act because 
the question is for their members how to make the best out of the case as the regulation 
is there anyway. Regulation is securing a signal to the companies that the specific work 
environment demands need to be taken seriously and thereby defines what behavior can 
be legitimate. However, regulation does not take the message all the way to the work-
shop floor. Our cases suggest that inclusion of Vedung’s (1998) two other policy instru-
ments (economic incentives and information) is needed in order to better reach out to 
target larger groups of companies. Having said that, the final step from the orchestrated 
policy program to actual workplace practice is still the most difficult impediment to 
overcome. This is where isomorphism is important. It is the institutionalization of the 
demands for a safe and healthy work environment, which is decisive for the employer’s 
and the employees’ decisions about not only to read about the problems or to listen to 
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inspectors, but also to actually perform the necessary change in order to prevent conse-
quences of poor work environment. The mechanisms behind such an institutionalization 
and subsequent coupling to workplace practice still need in-depth exploration. This is an 
important issue for further studies as well as for careful consideration by the network of 
stakeholders developing orchestrated programs.
7 conclusion
The Danish approach to the work environment was originally based on enforcement of 
work environment regulation. A long history has proven that enforcement alone can-
not secure a safe and healthy work environment. Government regulation has slowly 
moved into governance in network where different stakeholders, in particular the social 
partners, play a larger role. The governance led to emerging work environment policies 
developed on the basis of stakeholders’ interests and capacity. We identified a trend in 
the Danish work environment policy to use a stronger element of orchestration where 
the stakeholders try to develop programs in a more explicit and transparent manner that 
apply a combination of various policy instruments in order to create potential synergy 
effects of these combined measures. 
Orchestration seems to have the potential for improving the efficiency of work envi-
ronment policy programs. From our analysis, we can suggest a number of elements that 
are important for the utilization of orchestration as a strategy:
•    Orchestration is based on a platform of regulation. The unavoidable regulation im-
posed by the government is a necessary prerequisite for the social partners to agree 
on their full participation in an orchestrated strategy.
•    It is not sufficient just to combine several existing activities in one policy document. 
In such a case, the orchestration may end as just an example of window dressing. 
They have to be carefully designed in order to interact in a time sequence, to share 
objective and reach the planned target group in such a way that the recipients in the 
companies understand and accept the policy. Simply adding yet another instrument 
or measure is not enough for securing a successful outcome. In particular, the bal-
ance between regulation, voluntary action, economic incentives, information, and 
cultural-behavioral changes is important. 
•    Development of shared understanding of goals and instruments among the partici-
pating stakeholders is necessary for the subsequent implementation of the program. 
•    The overall mechanisms of isomorphism (coercive, normative, and mimetic) are im-
portant to consider when evaluating the effect of the orchestration strategy, as the 
desire to secure the legitimacy of one’s businesses is a basic driving force for all 
companies. 
Orchestration is a new concept in both work environment research and work envi-
ronment policy. It is therefore also a concept that needs further exploration in several 
directions. Orchestration seems to be a possible evolution of governance networks, and 
the existence and role of such networks in different countries and different contexts 
is an important issue for further studies. The same applies to studies of how orches-
trated strategies are developed: To what extent do stakeholders develop shared goals 
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and understanding of policy instruments? And how do they work in practice? Finally, 
there is a need to gain a much better understanding of the mechanisms creating change 
in the target group of companies. Often regulation and policies are considered from the 
point of view of the policymakers, and lesser attention is paid to the receiving end of 
companies which are simply expected to follow the centrally decided policy. 
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